Do IPO Firms Purchase Analyst Coverage With Underpricing?
Investment bankers provide a wide range of services to firms issuing new shares through an initial public offering (IPO). These services include pre-IPO activities related to the pricing, marketing, and distribution of the offering, as well as post-IPO activities such as price stabilization, market making, and analyst research coverage. Despite the variety of services provided to issuers and the variation in issuer characteristics, there is surprisingly little variation in the direct costs of completing an IPO. Chen and Ritter (2000) and Hansen (2001) show that underwriter spreads in IPOs are clustered at 7% for all but the very smallest and very largest offerings. Moreover, a 15% overallotment option is a standard feature of IPO contracts.
Both anecdotal and academic evidence indicates that research coverage has become an essential element of the security issuance process in recent years. Press reports indicate that star analysts play an important role in securing underwriting business. 1 This view is confirmed by Dunbar (2000) , who reports that underwriters increase their market share of IPOs if they have an analyst highly rated in the annual Institutional Investor survey, and Clarke, Dunbar, and Kahle company's IPO and its subsequent seasoned equity offering (SEO). The bottom line is that isssuing companies appear to place a value on securing research coverage from sell-side analysts, especially those who are highly-ranked. 2 If companies value research coverage, it follows that they are willing to allocate resources to acquire this coverage. Yet it is unclear how the payment for such service is made in IPOs. In this study, we empirically examine the hypothesis that issuing firms pay for analyst coverage via the underpricing of the offering. Lead underwriters can benefit from underpricing by allocating IPOs to preferred clients (perhaps in exchange for future investment banking business or high future trading commissions) and by serving as the primary market maker for the high aftermarket trading volume that typically follows underpriced IPOs. Thus, we hypothesize that issuers purchase analyst coverage by giving up greater underpricing at the time of the IPO. A corollary of this hypothesis is that if the lead underwriter does not deliver the expected research coverage, the issuing company is more likely to switch to a new underwriter for subsequent seasoned equity offers (SEOs). Although ours is not the first study to examine the relation between analyst research coverage and IPO underpricing, nor the first to examine the link between analyst coverage and the decision to switch underwriters, we are, to our knowledge, the first to examine the interconnections among these three aspects of the equity issuance process.
Our sample consists of 1,050 firms completing initial public offerings (IPOs) between 1993 and 2000 and also completing at least one subsequent SEO. We find that the analysts of lead underwriters make post-IPO recommendations in 839 of the 1,050 offerings. Of these 839 recommendations, 793 (95%) are either strong buy or buy recommendations. Despite the apparent uniformity in buy recommendations, however, there is a strong correlation between IPO underpricing and both the frequency and the perceived quality of subsequent recommendations.
For companies in the lowest quintile of IPO underpricing, the lead underwriter makes a recommendation (possibly including unfavorable ones) only 75% of the time. This rate increases to 86% for the highest quintile of underpricing. The difference is significant at the 0.01 level.
Similarly, the lead underwriter has an all-star analyst (as defined by Institutional Investor)
following the industry of the IPO firm in 16% of the firms in the lowest quintile of underpricing.
This rises to 35% for the firms in the highest quintile of underpricing. These findings from univariate tests are robust to controls for other determinants of underpricing and continue to hold when we control for endogeneity using a two-stage procedure.
The positive relation between underpricing and analyst coverage is consistent with the hypothesis that issuing firms compensate investment banks for high-quality analyst coverage via the underpricing of the offering. That is, issuers knowingly choose an underwriter with a highly ranked analyst with the expectation that there will be more money left on the table than if they had chosen a different underwriter. This is consistent with Loughran and Ritter's (2002b) analyst lust hypothesis. An alternative (though not mutually exclusive) explanation, offered by Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) , is that managers strategically underprice IPOs in order to attract interest from analysts and the media, thereby building price momentum.
Our analysis of the likelihood that an IPO issuer will switch lead underwriters between its IPO and its SEO helps distinguish the analyst lust hypothesis from the strategic underpricing hypothesis. Although we confirm Krigman, Shaw and Womack's (2001) finding that firms with lower underpricing are more likely to switch underwriters, we find that, controlling for underpricing, issuing companies are significantly more likely to switch lead underwriters if the lead underwriter does not have a recommendation outstanding at the one-year anniversary of the IPO. To our knowledge, the strategic underpricing hypothesis makes no predictions regarding the relation between analyst coverage and the likelihood of switching underwriters. Collectively, therefore, we believe our findings are most consistent with the hypothesis that underpricing is, in part, compensation for expected post-IPO analyst coverage. If underwriters do not deliver the expected analyst coverage (conditional on underpricing), the IPO firm is more likely to switch underwriters when it issues shares in its subsequent SEO.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section I, we detail our testable hypotheses and discuss how our study relates to other recent studies that examine IPO underpricing and post-IPO analyst coverage. Section II describes our sample and experimental design. Section III describes our main emprical results. Section IV discusses the implications of our findings and offers concluding remarks.
I. Hypothesis Development and Relation to Prior Studies
We hypothesize that issuing companies purchase analyst coverage by deliberately underpricing the IPO. In this section, we develop this and other hypotheses and discuss how our study relates to prior work in the IPO literature.
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A. Hypotheses
A necessary condition for the hypothesized link between underpricing and analyst coverage is that analyst recommendations are perceived by issuing companies to be valuable. This discussion leads to several empirical predictions. First, we hypothesize that analyst coverage by the lead underwriter is positively related to initial underpricing. While coverage can be measured in several ways, our analysis focuses on (i) the existence of analyst recommendations by lead underwriters, and (ii) the perceived quality of the lead underwriter's analyst. We focus on lead underwriters because they have the most to gain from underpricing through their primary role in allocating IPOs and through their subsequent role as the primary market makers. We focus on analyst recommendations rather than short-term earnings forecasts because recommendations are longer term and, hence, more difficult to compare to actual outcomes. Presumably, reputation effects will constrain analyst forecasts of near-term earnings to be close to actual outcomes. Consistent with this conjecture, Lin and McNichols (1998) report significant differences in the recommendations of lead underwriters of seasoned equity offerings versus those of unaffiliated analysts, but no evidence of differences in short-term earnings forecasts.
Second, we hypothesize that underwriters from investment banks with higher research reputations demand greater underpricing as compensation for their services (i.e. they earn rents).
That is, conditional on making a recommendation, underpricing should be greater in IPOs underwritten by more prestigious investment banks or those with higher rated analysts.
Third, we hypothesize that the likelihood of switching underwriters between the company's IPO and its SEO is associated with the unexpected amount of analyst coverage. That is, if analysts do not deliver the expected coverage (conditional on underpricing), companies are more likely to switch to a different underwriter for their SEO.
B. Relation to Prior Studies
At least three prior studies report a positive correlation between underpricing and some measure of analyst coverage. Rajan and Servaes (1997) find that, controlling for the post-IPO market value of equity, the number of analysts following an IPO stock is positively related to underpricing. This finding is consistent with Chemmanur (1993) , who predicts that equilibrium offer prices may involve underpricing in order to maximize outsider information production. In other words, unlike our hypothesis, Chemmanur's (1993) 
B. Variable Construction
The Appendix provides a summary of the key variables used in our analysis and the data sources. We briefly discuss some of the most important variables here. We measure underpricing as the percentage return from the SDC offer price to the first closing price on CRSP. If the first CRSP price is more than three days after the SDC issue date, we delete the issuer.
Measuring analyst coverage requires some subjective decisions on our part. Ideally, our measure will indicate whether the lead underwriter provides research coverage that is both timely and ongoing. Our primary measure is a dummy variable indicating whether the lead underwriter provides a recommendation on the issuer one year after the IPO. 8 Throughout the paper, when we refer to a company receiving "coverage," we are referring to this measure. We also consider the strength of the recommendation, but since 95% of the leads' recommendations are Strong
Buy or Buy, we focus primarily on the existence of a recommendation. We recognize that our time cutoff is arbitrary, but the one-year window should provide a reasonable opportunity for the lead underwriter to initiate coverage. As we discuss later, our results are robust to using six month or two year windows.
We also collect data on Institutional Investor's All-star Analyst Team. We match an IPO to an all-star if the lead underwriter has an all-star (first-, second-, or third-team) in the same industry as the issuer in the year of the issue or the prior year. 9 To measure the quality of the underwriter, we use Jay Ritter's updated Carter-Manaster (1990) underwriter reputation measures. We also use Ritter's data to construct variables to measure whether an issue was completed during a "hot market." 10 Specifically, for each IPO, we measure market conditions in two ways -as the total number of all IPOs (including those not in our sample) conducted during the month of and the month prior to the IPO, and as the average underpricing across all IPOs during the same two-month period. To get a firm-specific measure of a hot deal, we calculate a turnover variable as the ratio of average daily volume over the thirty trading days following the IPO to the number of shares issued. Table I the late-1990s exhibit the greatest underpricing, this period was not the most active period from the point of view of number of deals, even before we apply our SEO requirement. In unreported results we also find that the proportion of IPOs by technology companies in our sample was much greater in the late 1990s than earlier (73% in 1999 vs. 31% in 1993). Columns four and five of Table I show that the patterns of frequency and underpricing for our sample of IPOs are representative of the overall population of IPOs issued during the same time period.
C. Data description
The sixth column of Table I shows the fraction of IPOs for which we can definitively establish a link to the I/B/E/S database. 12 It is clear that in the first two years of our sample there are more unmatched deals. This means that we are potentially counting a deal as having no coverage, when in fact there may be coverage that we were simply unable to identify. In Section III.G., we show that our results are robust to excluding these deals. Overall, we match the lead underwriter to I/B/E/S for 96% of our IPOs. Our match rates and coverage frequencies are similar to those found in Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001). underpricing ranges from a low of -29% to a high of 606%. The presence of some extreme positive underpricing makes the median of 11.6% much less than the mean of 27.5%. The average IPO uses an underwriter with a reputation measure of 7.5. 13 About 22% of the issues employ a lead underwriter who has an all-star in that industry. Issuers raised a mean of $66 million (in 2000 dollars), with a range from $2.5 million to $2.9 billion. As first documented by Chen and Ritter (2000) , the underwriting spread is clustered at 7%, with 74% of the IPOs having a spread of exactly 7%. We also observe clustering at other integers such as 8% and 10% in our sample. Forty-five percent of the sample firms are defined as technology companies, and 96%
are traded on a major market (e.g. NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq NMS). Finally, the average offer price revision (i.e. the percentage difference between the offer price and the midpoint of the filing range) is 3.1%, though the median IPO is issued at the midpoint of the filing range. We observe large deviations in this variable, ranging from -60% to 140%.
III. Empirical Results
We begin our empirical analysis by reporting the frequency and distribution of post-IPO analyst recommendations. We then examine the link between underpricing and analyst coverage via univariate comparisons, ordinary least squares regressions, and two-stage OLS and logit models that control for the endogeneity of underpricing and analyst coverage. Finally, we examine whether the likelihood of switching underwriters for the company's SEO is related to the unexpected (conditional on underpricing) amount of post-IPO analyst coverage. Finally, the last two rows present data on the IPOs for which there are no analyst recommendations. There are 51 issuers for which we can determine a match between the SDC and I/B/E/S databases, but for which there is no coverage by the lead or any other analyst. In addition, there are 43 IPOs for which we are unable to definitively determine an SDC/ I/B/E/S match. In all likelihood, most of these unmatched issuers probably do not get coverage as they tend to be very small IPOs ($9.9 million average proceeds), in small industries, have low share turnover, and are done by less prestigious underwriters (2.7 average reputation). These issuers also are very likely (76%) to switch underwriters for the SEO. Our results are robust to the exclusion of these 43 observations. 
A. Analyst Coverage and Recommendations
Panel B of
B. Univariate Comparisons of Underpricing and Analyst Coverage
In Panel A of Table IV , we first sort the sample IPOs into quintiles based on underpricing, then compare average values of key variables across the quintiles. Some of these data are also depicted graphically in Figure 1 . Average underpricing ranges from -2.5% in the lowest quintile to 98.7% in the highest quintile. Consistent with our hypothesis, analyst coverage (recommendation or forecast) is positively related to underpricing. Ninety-four percent of the firms in the highest quintile receive some coverage (recommendation or earnings forecasts), as compared to about 85% in the lowest two quintiles. The pattern for lead recommendations is similar, ranging from about 73% up to 86%. A test of equality across quintiles rejects the hypothesis that underpricing is unrelated to analyst coverage at the 0.01 level.
These findings support the hypothesis that underwriters agree to provide coverage to those issuers who agree to greater underpricing. However, consistent with Rajan and Servaes (1997) and Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001), the next column shows that non-lead underwriters are also more likely to cover deals that have large underpricing. Although the set of non-lead underwriters includes co-managers who may also benefit from underpricing, this result indicates that our subsequent tests will need to control for the possibility that greater underpricing leads to greater coverage.
Consistent with Beatty and Welch (1996) , there is a positive relation between underpricing and the reputation of the underwriter. Similarly, the frequency of all-star coverage roughly doubles as one moves from the lower three underpricing quintiles to the highest quintile.
Apparently, the issuers don't mind the underpricing. Consistent with the findings in Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001), almost half of the low-underpricing firms switch underwriters, while only a sixth of the high-underpricing firms switch. To the extent that highly underpriced IPOs receive greater analyst coverage, this finding supports our hypothesis. However, another explanation for this pattern, offered by Loughran and Ritter (2002a), is that the issuers with greatest underpricing are happy because they ended up with greater proceeds (and wealth) than they originally anticipated. Consistent with this view, we (like others) find a positive relation between offer price revisions and underpricing. The least underpriced deals have a 12%
reduction from the midpoint of the filing range, whereas the most underpriced issues have a 26%
increase prior to the IPO. Finally, there is a strong industry effect in the underpricing quintiles.
Seventy-one percent of the IPOs in the highest quintile are technology firms, compared to about 35% to 45% for the other quintiles.
Panel B of the table repeats the exercise for many of the same variables, now splitting the sample based on whether the lead underwriter makes a recommendation. When the lead makes a recommendation, average underpricing is 30.5%, which is significantly larger than the average of 15.7% when there is no lead recommendation. IPOs without lead coverage tend to be underwritten by lower quality banks, have higher underwriting spreads, and have lower offer price revisions. Consistent with our hypothesis, issuers who do not get a recommendation from their lead IPO underwriter tend to be much more likely to use a different underwriter for their first SEO (63% switch) than issuers who do get recommendations (26% switch).
C. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results
To facilitate comparison of our results with the existing literature, we estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in which underpricing is the dependent variable. Table V shows three specifications, starting with one in which we do not include any analyst coverage-related variables. All three models contain calendar year dummy variables to control for intertemporal variation in average pricing. Consistent with our univariate findings, underpricing is positively related to underwriter reputation and the offer price revision. The offer price revision variable is a particularly strong determinant of IPO underpricing, consistent with the partial adjustment phenomenon first reported in Hanley (1993).
We find weak evidence (t-statistics of about -1.7) of a negative relation between issue size and underpricing, a significant negative relation for offerings not traded on a major exchange, a significant positive relation for both the market-wide level of average IPO underpricing and the CRSP value-weighted return, and a significant negative relation with firm age. 15 We find no relation to the frequency of IPOs in the market, the underwriter spread, In model (2) we add a dummy variable equal to one if the lead underwriter provides an analyst recommendation. The inclusion of this variable essentially has no effect. The point estimate is not significantly different from zero and is small in economic magnitude, the other variables are not affected, and the adjusted R 2 actually drops. This is inconsistent with our first hypothesis which predicts a positive relation between underpricing and coverage. However, as we demonstrate in the next section, it is important to control for the endogeneity between underpricing and coverage. 
D. Two-stage Estimation to Control for Endogeneity
One criticism of the OLS regressions in Table V is that they assume that analyst coverage is exogenous. Based on the discussion in Section I, however, it is clear that underpricing and analyst coverage may be endogenous. Similar to the approach adopted in Lowry and Shu (2002), we attempt to mitigate the bias that this endogeneity induces in the regression coefficients by using a two-stage estimation procedure. We estimate first-stage models of underpricing and analyst coverage including the same set of exogenous variables in each equation. Our choice of variables is motivated by the large literature on the determinants of underpricing, as well as the determinants of analyst coverage. Specifically, we include variables for the log of real proceeds, the lead underwriter's reputation, the relative size of the industry, average trading volume for the thirty trading days following the IPO scaled by the number of shares offered, the number of co-lead managers, the number of IPOs by any firm in the month of the issue and the prior month, the average underpricing during this period, the gross underwriting spread, the offer price revision, the average and standard deviation of returns on the valueweighted CRSP index during the three weeks prior to the issuance, the log of one plus firm age, and dummy variables for technology firms, all-star coverage by the lead underwriter, and whether the firm is not listed on a major exchange. The underpricing regression is estimated by OLS and the coverage model is estimated by logit. The coefficient estimates from these firststage models are reported in the first two columns of Table VI. We then use the fitted values from these models as instruments in the second stage estimation. The second stage models also include as independent variables those exogenous variables that have a strong theoretical justification. The standard errors for the second-stage estimates correct for estimation error in the first stage using the procedure described in Maddala (1983).
The results in the third column of Table VI identify two main determinants of coverage.
The first is the reputation of the lead underwriter, which is positive and highly significant (t = 6.0). To interpret the economic magnitude, we compare the estimated probability of coverage at the sample mean, where the underwriter reputation is 7.5, to the probability when the reputation rank increases to the maximum of 9. Our estimates indicate that moving from an average underwriter to the most reputable underwriter increases the likelihood of coverage by 6.5%. The all-star variable is negative and significant, with a t-statistic of -2.2. Again, we evaluate the economic impact of moving from no all-star to having an all-star. The impact of the all-star is a drop in the likelihood of coverage of 8.2%. This comparative static is somewhat misleading since it is unlikely that a firm would have an underwriter with average reputation and an all-star.
When we combine these two effects, they largely offset. In comparing an issuer using an average reputation underwriter with no all-star to an otherwise identical issuer using a highly reputable underwriter with an all-star, the likelihood of coverage drops by 0.4%. Finally, we note that the underpricing instrument is positive, but not significantly different from zero.
Overall, the model has a pseudo-R 2 of 0.173, correctly classifying 84.9% of the IPOs.
The last column of Table VI shows the results for the underpricing regression.
Consistent with our second hypothesis, we find that the presence of an all-star analyst increases underpricing by an economically large 13.9 percentage points (t-statistic of 3.6). However, partially offsetting this effect, a one-point increase in the underwriter's rank lowers underpricing by 1.52 percentage points. In comparing an issuer with an underwriter of average reputation (7.5) and no all-star analyst to an identical issuer with a highly reputable underwriter (9) and an all-star analyst, we find that underpricing is increased in the second case by 11.6 percentage points.
We also observe a strong positive relation between the spread and underpricing (t = 2.8).
Increasing the spread by a percentage point increases underpricing by 11 percent. As other researchers have shown, the offer price revision is a strong predictor of underpricing (t = 9.7).
Given the point estimate of 0.78, a one standard deviation increase in the revision raises underpricing by 17.4%. 16 Underpricing is related to pre-issuance conditions in the IPO market.
Underpricing is higher when average underpricing across all recent IPOs is high (t = 5.9) and, consistent with Benveniste et al. (2003), lower when the volume of IPOs is high (t = -2.7).
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Underpricing is also positively related to the pre-issuance value-weighted market return (t = 2.2).
Old firms have lower underpricing than young firms (t = -2.4), consistent with the notion that
underpricing is related to uncertainty about the issuer. We also find evidence that technology firms have greater underpricing after controlling for other determinants of underpricing.
Of primary interest is the coefficient on the instrument for analyst coverage. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a strong positive relation between the coverage instrument and underpricing (t = 3.2). Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the economic impact of expected analyst coverage on underpricing since the unidentifiable volatility of residuals in the first-stage logit introduces a nuisance parameter. Overall, the regression has an adjusted R 2 of 0.45. These findings support the view that the likelihood of subsequent analyst coverage is an important determinant of the magnitude of underpricing. One interpretation of this finding is that issuing companies pay for expected analyst coverage by discounting the price at which they sell new shares.
We caution the reader that because some of the exogenous variables that predict underpricing also predict analyst coverage, part of their impact on underpricing may be picked up by the coverage instrument. If so, collinearity with the coverage instrument will increase the standard errors of the coefficient estimates. One should, therefore, interpret the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients on the exogenous variables with caution. We note, however, that the coefficient estimates are, with the exception of underwriter rank, similar in sign and statistical significance to those reported for the OLS regressions in Table V . This provides some reassurance that our findings are not driven by our instrumental variables approach. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the significance of the coverage instrument is sensitive to the inclusion of year dummies in the second stage models. Because we attempt to capture time trends in the data by including year dummies in the first stage, inclusion of the year dummies in the second stage induces fairly severe collinearity problems. This shows up in the form of substantially larger standard errors on the coefficient estimates after having made the adjustment for first-stage estimation. Consequently, virtually nothing is statistically significant if we include the year dummies in the second stage.
E. Subperiod Results
Because the 1998-2000 period exhibits dramatically higher underpricing and Loughran and Ritter (2002b) document nonstationarities in some of the cross-sectional determinants of underpricing, we also estimate the models in Table VI It is also noteworthy that the coefficient on the coverage instrument is significant in both of the first two subperiods. This provides some reassurance that our overall finding of a significant relation between underpricing and coverage is not driven by the 1998-2000 period.
F. Switching of Underwriters
Our final hypothesis predicts that issuing companies will switch underwriters between their IPO and their subsequent SEO if they believe they have received less analyst coverage than expected. To test this hypothesis, we examine how coverage and underpricing jointly affect an issuer's decision to switch underwriters at the SEO.
Recall from On the other hand, splitting issuers into coverage categories does not remove the spread across underpricing quintiles. For firms with recommendations from the lead underwriter, the 37% switch rate for the low-underpricing quintile is three times that of the high-underpricing quintile. Similarly, among firms without recommendations from the lead underwriter, the 74% switching rate in the low-underpricing quintile is nearly double the rate for the high-underpricing quintile. These findings suggest that analyst coverage is only part of the explanation for why issuing firms switch underwriters.
To provide further evidence on the determinants of underwriter switching, we estimate logit models to predict switching behavior. Our analysis is similar to that in Krigman, Shaw, and
Womack (2001), with one important addition. We include in our model the unexpected analyst coverage (actual coverage minus the predicted probability) from our second-stage estimates in Table VI . The results are reported in Table IX . 18 We consider a base model using a constant, the log of offer proceeds, offer price revision, share turnover, underwriter spread, dummy for an all-star analyst at the IPO and SEO lead underwriter, IPO and SEO underwriter rank, the number of calendar days from IPO to SEO, the log of one plus firm age, and IPO underpricing. We find that switching is more likely for firms that have a small offer price revision, firms whose IPO underwriter has a lower reputation, firms whose SEO underwriter has a high reputation, and firms for which there is a long time between IPO and SEO.
The The last set of columns in Table IX augment the base model with a measure of unexpected coverage. Our third hypothesis predicts that if a firm receives less coverage than expected, they will be more likely to use a different underwriter for their SEO. We find that this is indeed the case. The unexpected coverage variable has a t-statistic of -4.8. Unfortunately, we are unable to assess the economic significance for the same reason as in Table VI. 19
G. Robustness Checks
To ensure that our results are not driven by methodological choices or a small number of influential observations, we run a battery of robustness checks. One group of tests replicates all our analyses after filtering the sample in a variety of ways. First, we exclude the 160 observations for which the IPO was completed in 1999 or 2000. This addresses the concern that our findings are biased by the fact that firms completing their IPO in these years have done SEOs quickly, relative to the rest of the sample. Truncating the sample in 1998 allows each firm three years to complete an SEO, which is approximately double the average of 1.55 years between IPO and SEO for firms in this subsample. Second, we exclude firms with offer prices below $8, as in Loughran and Ritter (2002a) . This reduces our sample to 920 firms. Third, we exclude observations in the extreme 1% tails of the underpricing distribution. Fourth, we exclude the 111 observations for which the company's SEO takes place more than three years after the IPO.
Fifth, because I/B/E/S's coverage of analyst recommendations may have been less complete prior to 1995, we exclude 354 offerings completed in 1993 and 1994. 20 Sixth, we restrict the sample to include only IPOs completed after 1994 and those for which the company's SEO takes place more than three years after the IPO. This reduces the sample by 402 observations. Seventh, we restrict the sample to only those firms that initially trade on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq NMS. In all cases, our main results are not affected in any material way. Specifically, we continue to find a positive relation between underpricing and predicted coverage, and continue to find that the likelihood of switching underwriters at the time of the SEO is negatively related to unexpected analyst coverage following the IPO.
The second group of robustness test focuses on methodological choices. Again, none of these checks meaningfully alters our main results. First, we estimate all logit models by probit.
Second, we delete from our main sample the 43 offers for which we are unable to link SDC underwriters with I/B/E/S brokers. Our main analysis considers these IPOs as having received no coverage. However, it is possible that these deals do get coverage but either I/B/E/S does not follow that brokerage firm or we did not properly identify the link between SDC and I/B/E/S bank codes. Third, we exclude observations for which the time between IPO and SEO is less than one year. Recall that we measure coverage as of one year after the issuance, so for these deals we are measuring coverage after the SEO. This results in a loss of about half our sample, down to 518 firms, of which 370 have coverage. This sub-sample has much lower underpricing (13% on average) and much higher switching rates for the SEO underwriter (50% on average).
However, our main results remain intact. Underpricing is positively associated with expected coverage, while the likelihood of switching underwriters is negatively related to unexpected coverage. These findings also indicate that our primary results are not driven by successful companies that quickly issue an SEO in the first year following their IPO. Fourth, we include the annualized stock returns between IPO and SEO as an explanatory variable. Again, our results are unaffected.
A third group of robustness checks reconstructs the sample using alternative windows for measuring analyst coverage. First, we record a firm as receiving recommendation coverage if it has a recommendation from the lead underwriter six months after the IPO. This increases the number of firms without coverage from 237 to 291. Our main results remain intact. Second, we repeat the analysis after measuring analyst coverage as of the two-year anniversary of the IPO.
Because this means we are checking for coverage well after many firms have done at least one SEO, we again filter out deals where there is less than a year between IPO and SEO. Although this reduces the sample to 518 observations, of which 350 have coverage, our main results are robust. Finally, we measure coverage as receiving a recommendation during any point in the first year following the IPO. By this measure, a firm that receives coverage for only a few months is counted as receiving coverage. This less restrictive measure records 874 deals with lead coverage, compared to 839 in the main sample, but does not change our results.
Finally, we examine the possibility that lead underwriters choose not to provide recommendations on some firms because they deem these particular issuers to be sufficiently unimportant to merit any analyst coverage. To examine this issue, we first create a sub-sample of IPOs for which the lead underwriter provides earnings forecasts. We know for sure that the analyst is following these firms. We then split these firms into two groups based on whether the analyst of the lead underwriter also makes a recommendation. Of the 928 firms with earnings forecasts from the lead underwriter, 830 also have a lead recommendation and 98 do not.
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Those issuers receiving recommendations have average underpricing of 30%, significantly greater than the 19% average for those who do not have recommendations. In addition, we observe that among those firms that do not receive a lead recommendation, 55% switch underwriters for their SEO. This happens in only 26% of the cases in which there is a lead recommendation. Thus, among the subset of firms for which the lead underwriter provides analyst coverage, (i) underpricing is significantly greater for firms receiving analyst recommendations, and (ii) firms are significantly more likely to switch underwriters if the lead IPO underwriter chooses not to issue a recommendation. The fact that our main results continue to hold for the sub-sample of firms that clearly receive some analyst attention provides reassurance that our main findings are not driven by cases in which the analyst of the lead underwriter simply ignores issuers that they deem to be unimportant. Our results are more consistent with the view that the lack of a recommendation is driven by strategic considerations.
That is, banks seek to avoid offending their clients by making negative recommendations, but also want to avoid ruining their reputations by providing favorable coverage to issuers with poor prospects.
IV. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
We examine the links among IPO underpricing, post-IPO analyst coverage, and the likelihood of switching underwriters. Our findings indicate a significant positive relation between underpricing and analyst coverage by the lead underwriter. This positive association is robust to controls for other determinants of underpricing previously documented in the literature and to controls for the endogeneity of underpricing and analyst coverage. In addition, after controlling for other potential determinants of switching underwriters, we find that the probability of switching underwriters between IPO and SEO is negatively related to the unexpected amount of post-IPO analyst coverage. We interpret these findings as consistent with the hypothesis that underpricing is, in part, compensation for expected post-IPO analyst coverage. If underwriters do not deliver the expected analyst coverage (conditional on underpricing), the IPO firm is more likely to switch underwriters when it issues shares in its subsequent SEO. Our findings can help explain a few otherwise puzzling IPO phenomena. First, recent studies [e.g., Beatty and Welch (1996) ] report that the correlation between underpricing and underwriter reputation has changed signs from negative in the 1970s and 1980s [Carter and Manaster (1990) ] to positive in the 1990s. To the extent that analyst coverage has become more important in the past decade, as argued in Loughran and Ritter (2002b), our hypothesis predicts that more prestigious underwriters will be compensated for expected analyst coverage with greater underpricing.
Second, the increased importance of analyst coverage in recent years can help explain the large increase in the salaries of sell-side analysts during the late 1990s. Our hypothesis predicts that investment banks receive additional compensation, via underpricing, for the research coverage that they provide. Presumably, a portion of this compensation is passed on to the analysts providing such coverage. Of course, as underwriting business and merger/acquisition activity has declined over the past couple of years, so too has analyst compensation. This has led to some high profile departures of analysts and to large cutbacks in the research staff at Wall Street firms. 
Table V OLS Regression ResultsWith Underpricing as the Dependent Variable
Cross-sectional regressions of percentage IPO underpricing on calendar year dummy variables (not reported), the log of real proceeds in year 2000 dollars, underwriter rank, the frequency of IPOs in the market during the current or prior month, the average underpricing of IPOs over the current or prior month, the underwriter spread, the price revision between the midpoint of the initial filing range and the offer price, a dummy variable for offerings not listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ NMS, a dummy variable for technology companies, the average CRSP value-weighted index return over the three weeks up to issuance, the standard deviation of CRSP value-weighted index return over the three weeks up to issuance, the log of one plus firm age at issuance, a dummy variable equal to one if the lead underwriter makes a recommendation, and a dummy variable equal to one of the lead underwriter has an All-star analyst covering the industry of the IPO company. Coefficients are reported with heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses below. Table VII Sub-period Results Descriptives statistics and two-stage regression coefficients for each of three subperiods, 1993-1994, 1995-1997, and 1998-2000 . Panel A reports average underpricing, the percentage of issues in which the lead underwriter has an all-star analyst, and the percentage of issues for which the analyst from the lead underwriter provides a recommendation as of the one-year anniversary of the IPO. Panel B reports coefficient estimates with t-statistics in parentheses below for selected independent variables from two-stage regression models identical to those estimated in Table VI Table IX Probability of Switching Lead Underwriters Results of a logit model predicting whether an issuer switches lead underwriters from IPO to the first SEO. The table reports the estimated coefficient and t-statistic for the test of a zero coefficient, as well as the predicted magnitude of impact on the probability of switching. Each magnitude is calculated by comparing the predicted change in probability of switching from perturbing the variable of interest while holding all other values at their sample means. For IPO or SEO Lead All-star, the perturbation is changing from zero to one. For all other variables, the perturbation is a change from the mean to the mean plus one standard deviation. Unexpected coverage is the residual (actual coverage dummy minus predicted probability of coverage) from the second-stage coverage model in Table VI , where coverage is defined as having an analyst recommendation at the one-year anniversary of the IPO. Standard errors in this regression correct for first-stage estimation error using the method in Murphy and Topel (1985 
